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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 21/06/2008 Accident number: 581 
Accident time: 07:58 Accident Date: 21/11/2007 
Where it occurred: MF: A-Kurmuk, M/F 
NR 91, DA NR 286. 
Country: Sudan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 05/12/2007 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMAO Sudan 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PRB M35 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
dry/dusty 
sparse trees 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 21/06/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: E 034° 17' 18.1" Map north: N 10° 32' 59.5" 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 
Details of this accident were made available as a collection of *.PDF files in June 2008. The 
conversion of these documents to a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being 
lost. The demining group involved was a serving military unit operating with UNMIS. Names of 
personnel and the demining group involved have been removed. Some detail related to the 




Summary: At approximately 07:55hrs on 21 November 2007 a mine accident occurred within 
the hazardous area of Minefield NR 91 during operations being conducted as part of Task NR 
206. The accident resulted in injuries being sustained by a member of the MCT 1 of the 
[Demining group]-II. 
As a result of the injuries sustained by the casualty, casevac from the hazardous area to the 
Level 1 facility at Kurmuk was required and subsequently from there to the Level 2 facility at 
Damazin. 
A PI was convened in order to document the findings resulting from the investigation into the 
accident, relevant events pre and post accident, to provide conclusions as to the probable 
and most likely causes and to provide pertinent recommendations aimed at reducing the 
possibility of such an occurrence happening again and at improving and/or correcting 
procedures pre and/or post accident. 
General Geographic Information: In summary M/F NR 91 lays parallel to the 
Sudan/Ethiopian border on a North/South axis with the nearest inhabited location being 
Kurmuk. The general landscape is typical of the area i.e. undulating ground, alternating 
between flat heavily vegetated areas and small rocky outcrops (‘jebeles’) in many places. 
Underfoot the ground is covered by heavy vegetation and is rock-strewn on the surface and at 
sub-surface levels. In general, the minefield is laid on the high ground sloping down to a river 
which marks the border. 
 
[The accident site after post-accident marking had been removed.] 
Specific Geographic Information: The lay of the land at the scene of the accident finds it 
sloping away from the Control Point area in the west down towards the border in the east. 
The clearance activity was being conducted up the slope in an east to west direction. The 
immediate vicinity of the accident has been cleared of vegetation and provides unrestricted 
access. In the surrounding hazardous areas the vegetation is heavy. Underfoot the ground is 
firm in the cleared areas. The soil and surface conditions are typical for the area. 
Weather: The weather and conditions at the time of the accident was typical for the time of 
the day and year i.e. relative early morning coolness, dry, bright sunshine, clear blue skies 
and daylight giving excellent and unrestricted vision. 
Priority: Task NR 206 is rated by the Land Impact Survey (LIS) as ‘HIGH’. It therefore was 
given the appropriate priority by United Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 
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Type of Task: Task NR 206 is a ‘minefield clearance’ which involves 2 types of demining 
procedures, manual mine clearance (MMC) and mine detection dogs (MDD. The use of MDD 
has been restricted to support to [Demining group Team]-I over the period 06 May – 24 May 
2007 during which they verified/cleared 3,812m2. 
During/Post-accident: The following details apply: 
General Site Layout & Marking: The general site layout and marking viewed by the PIT 
[Preliminary Investigation Team] at both the non-hazardous and hazardous areas was of a 
satisfactory standard and in compliance with accredited SOPs and/or other applicable 
documentation. 
Scene of Accident: When the PIT arrived at the scene of the accident there was initially a 
great deal of confusion and concern. The site marking encountered indicated that the specific 
spot of the accident had occurred within a hazardous area. After consultation and discussion 
with relevant appointments of the [Demining group]-II, it was determined that the scene of the 
accident had been interfered with and the marking stones moved. Following instructions from 
the NQAC, the site marking was restored. 
NOTE: There is no way of determining or confirming if this is accurate or reflected the 
marking prior to the accident occurring. 
Other: Close to the vicinity of the accident, near to the small tree, pieces of insulating tape 
were found. This was considered to have been evidence of the demolition conducted the 
previous day. 
 
[The “crater” before excavation.] 
 
[The crater after excavation. See Analysis.] 
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During Accident: The following applies: 
During the minefield briefing and prior to the explosion/accident occurring it was noted that 
the soldier giving the briefing was neither the Platoon Commander nor his Deputy. The soldier 
providing the briefing was in-fact normally employed as a section commander. This was to be 
commented on and queried at the completion of the briefing but that point was not reached. 
This is contrary to the [Demining group]-II accredited SOPs and the IP for Task NR 206 both 
which clearly state that either one of the aforementioned must be on-site at all times unless 
prior authorisation for their absence is sought from and given by UNMAO. Authorisation for 
this had not been given. 
On-site Procedures: Post-accident procedures on-site and during the immediate aftermath 
of the accident were not witnessed and so cannot be commented on. However the PIT were 
witness to the speed and efficiency that the casualty was evacuated from the hazardous area 
to the safe area which was completed effectively and well within the required standards of the 
accredited SOPs. This fact is even more commendable given the fact that it was the Section 
Commander (Acting) that was the casualty and would have necessitated a shift in command 
and control and the taking of the initiative by individuals unknown. Comment was provided by 
the UNMAO Medical Advisor who was at the Level I clinic that the standard of medical aid 
given in the hazardous area and prior to arrival at the Level I clinic was excellent. 
Equipment and PPE: There has been no deviation from accredited SOPs regarding the 
equipment, tools, dress and PPE nor has there been adverse comment regarding its 
standard, serviceability and/or application throughout the duration of the task. This same 
statement applies to the day of the accident. 
Mines/UXO: General: To date 122 anti-personnel mines have been located and destroyed by 
the [Demining group]. These have been of the following designations; 101 x PRB M35 and 20 
x M14. All of these mines have been found using the `complete excavation' method. Of these, 
[Demining group] -II have located/destroyed 91 x PRB M35 and 18 x M14. According to the 
records and information received from the [Demining group]-II all the mines have been 
located at a depth of 2 – 4cm (see Appendix 11). In addition 22 x UXO of various 
designations have been located/destroyed. Of these, [Demining group]-II have 
located/destroyed 14 x UXO. [A]… number of M14s had been located within close proximity 
of the accident with one being located and destroyed the previous day. 
Evidence of remining: There was no evidence of re-mining in the area of the accident. It is 
acknowledged by the PIT that there are continual unauthorised incursions into the hazardous 
area by locals and other persons unknown. This has been evidenced in various ways 
including the cutting of wood, human excrement deposits, dead animals being deposited and 
more recently acts of vandalism to name a few. This issue is well documented and recorded. 
It is further acknowledged that there had been activity of wood cutting close to the accident 
scene the night prior to the accident. However, as already detailed, there was no evidence of 
re-mining within the immediate vicinity of the accident. The only witness that was available to 
provide information relating to this matter was [Name removed]. He was questioned on this 
matter a number of times and stated both during the interview with the PIT at the CP and 
once again whilst at the scene of the accident that there was no evidence of re-mining or 
interference with the specific location of his clearance lane or that he did not notice any 
evidence of this nature in the immediate vicinity. He commented that there had been some 
wood cutting close to the scene but that no evidence of disturbance in the immediate area of 
his working lane was evident. He further states in his statement that he inspected his worksite 
for signs of interference and did not witness any. This is in accordance with accredited SOPs 
and normal procedure prior to commencing work. 
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Initial report form [Demining group] 
Date: 22 Nov 2007 
To: All Concerned 
Subject: Detailed Written Report of Mine Accident  
NTSG Edition 8, Chapter 15, Para 4.1.c refers (to be forwarded within 48 hours of accidents). 
1. General. [Demining group] started its demining in minefield A-Kurmuk on 5 August 07 after 
getting accreditation certificate of United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO). On 21 
November at 0758 hours, a mine accident occurred in the cleared area of minefield - A 
Kurmuk. In this accident, left foot of Acting Section Commander [the Victim] was seriously 
injured. 
2. Sequence of Events. Various demining activities and events till accident are described 
below in chronological order :- 
a. Both the demining platoons (A and B) left [Demining group] Camp at 0630 hours for the 
demining site. 
b. As per SOP, demining was started at 0730 hours. UNMAO officials (National QA 
Coordinator Mr. [Name removed], Ops Officer Mr. [Name removed] and Sub office QA Officer 
Mr. [Name removed]) also arrived at the location of A Platoon site (Control Point) for routine 
visit. 
c. [The Victim], who was performing the duties of Acting Section Commander, was 
supervising the demining work of his under command deminers. He was supervising the 
deminer's work while standing in the already cleared area. 
d. At 0758 hours when [the Victim] was moving in the cleared area , an Anti personnel mine 
exploded under his left foot. 
e. Casualty was provided medical support on the site as per SOP and evacuated to the 
Platoon medical point. Medics provided medical treatment and casualty was further 
evacuated to level-I hospital of Pakistan Demining Company — II. 
f. By 0805 hours, all concerned officials (Sector HQ COO, Radio Room Damazine, Aviation 
Ops Officer) were immediately informed on telephone by the Commanding Officer about the 
accident. They were asked to start preparing for medical evacuation from Kurmuk to level-II 
hospital. At 0945 hours, casualty was evacuated through helicopter to level-II hospital Ed-
Damazin. 
g. [The Victim] has been further evacuated to level-III hospital Khartoum on 22 November 07. 
h. Due to severe nature of injury, he will be shifted to level-IV hospital Kenya (for orthopedic 
surgery) on 24 November 2007. 
3. Important Facts of Demining Operation at Kurmuk. Following important facts are 
highlighted regarding ongoing demining operation at Kurmuk:- 
a. Method Used. [Demining group] is using 100% full excavation method for the demining 
operation in this minefield. In this method, minefield area is completely excavated up to 15 cm 
from top of the surface. Employment of this method does not leave the possibility of missing 
any mine. So far, [Demining group] has found and destroyed 122 mines using this method. It 
is worth mentioning that all the 122 mines have been found up to a maximum depth of 2-4 
5 
cm. Photos at Annex A highlight the full excavation up to 15 cm being carried out and the 
location of mines. 
b. Location of Accident. Area where accident happened was cleared few days before (from 8 
to 13 November 07). There were routine movements of deminer, section commander, platoon 
Commander and platoon EOD Commander in this cleared area. 
c. Quality Assurance (QA) Check. UNMAO QA Officer [Name removed] had paid number of 
visits to the demining site and carried out QA of area cleared by [Demining group]. During the 
UNMAO QA visits, work of [Demining group] was found as per SOP. UNMAO QA visited the 
site of A Platoon (site where accident happened) on 15 November 2007 and carried out QA 
check of all the area cleared up to 15 November and found the demining work as per SOP. 
d. Point of Concern. On 18 September 07, some unknown individuals created a lot of 
disturbance inside and in the adm areas of both the platoon. Matter was reported to Sector 
HQ immediately. Deputy Sector Commander came to Kurmuk to see the situation and also 
held meeting with local authorities. 
4. UNMAO Board of Inquiry (B01). After the mine accident, UNMAO National QA Coordinator 
informed undersigned that a BOI comprising Chairman (UNMAO National QA Coordinator) 
and 2xmembers (UNMAO Ops Officer and UNMAO QA Officer) has been has been convened 
by the UNMAO HQ. Till 2130 hours 22 November 2007, PDC-II has not received any 
convening orders from the UNMAO HQ. It is mentioned that above mentioned board started 
the inquiry at the site at about 1030 hours on 21 Nov 07, undertook the statements of various 
individuals and completed their inquiry formalities by 1400 hours the same day. PDC-II 
provided all the original documents, log books QA forms etc, asked by the board at Kurmuk. 
All members of the board moved back to Damazine at about 1500 hours, 21 November.  
BOI asked for the original documents to take it along with them which was regretted, 
however, photo copy of all the required documents were handed over to the board on 23 
November 07 at Damazine. It is also pertinent to mention that composition of the board 
(which has started the inquiry) is not in accordance with NTSG (Chapter 15, para 3.3 c). A 
member of a senior rank (major or Lt Col) from [Demining group] is very important which is 
still missing. According to the NTSG there should be a member from third party to have 
transparency in inquiry. Completion of Inquiry in such a hasty manner (by the above 
mentioned board) of such kind of serious incident is not understood. It is suggested that all 
members (as per convening orders) be assembled at Kurmuk to complete the inquiry, 
covering all legal formalities, to reach at concrete findings and recommendations. 
5. Inquiry by UNMIS. Sector Headquarters has also issued convening orders to start the 
inquiry. This board will be headed by a Lt Col (CO tpt Coy) and two other members from the 
sector. Board will assemble at Kurmuk on 25 November 07. 
6. Suspension of Work. UNMAO officials have suspended the demining work. Both the 
platoons will start the demining work after completion of Court of Inquiry and its findings 
7. Forwarded for information please. 
[Signed] 
 
Court Of Inquiry  
To Inquire Into The Circumstances Under Which [the Victim] Of [Demining group] Got Injured 
(Left Foot Heel) On 21 November 2007 In Minefield Area Due To The Mine Blast. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 At 07:58hrs on 21 November 2007, a mine accident occurred resulting in injury to a 
deminer from the [Demining group]. 
1.2 The mine accident occurred at N 10° 32' 59.5" E 034° 17' 18.1". This location falls within 
the area being cleared by the Mine Clearance Team 1 (MCT 1) of the [Demining group]. 
1.3 The clearance task is referred to in the Information Management System Mine Action 
(IMSMA) as Minefield Northern Region 91 (M/F NR 91) and Danger Area Northern Region 
286 (DA NR 286). 
1.4 The task falls within the area of responsibility (AOR) of the Damazin United Nations Mine 
Action Office (UNMAO) which in turn falls within the AOR of the United Nations Northern 
Regional Mine Action Office (UNNRMAO) based in Kadugli. 
1.5 As a result of this accident, a Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened … in order to 
investigate the aforementioned accident. [Reference A, Convening order, omitted.] 
2. REFERENCES 
2.1 Reference B: As a result of the aforementioned mine accident a 'Preliminary Investigation' 
(PI) was conducted. A report, Reference B, providing the complete detail of the PI is included 
as `Inclusion 2' to this report [reproduced above]. This is required to be read in conjunction 
with this report as it provides a significant amount of pertinent detail not otherwise repeated 
within this report but that was used to assist the BOI throughout its deliberations and in 
arriving at the conclusions and subsequent recommendations as recorded within this report. 
2.2 Reference C: Is the result of the 'Court Of Inquiry To Inquire Into The Circumstances 
Under Which [the Victim] Of [Demining group] Got Injured (Left Foot Heel) On 21 November 
2007 In Minefield Area Due To The Mine Blast' conducted by the [Demining group]. This 
report is included at 'Inclusion 3' to this report. This is required to be read in conjunction with 
this report as it provides a significant amount of pertinent detail not otherwise repeated here 
but that was used to assist the BOI throughout its deliberations and in arriving at the 
conclusions and subsequent recommendations asrecorded within this report. 
2. AIM 
2.1 The aim of this report is to: 
2.1.1 Provide a brief summary of the significant events/activities conducted during the BOI. 
2.1.1 To provide conclusions arrived at as a result of the findings of the BOI. 
2.1.3 To provide recommendations resulting from the aforementioned conclusions. 
3. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS/ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY THE BOI 
3.1 The following … provides summarised details of the significant events/activities conducted 
by the BOI and that resulted in the findings, conclusions and recommendations: 
1. 03/0900/Dec07: BOI commenced: The BOI met at the [Name removed] in Kurmuk 
2.  03/0900/Dec07: Opening address: The BOI Chairman opened the BOI with an introduction 
aimed at ensuring the BOI members were appraised of the aims of the BOI, the conduct and 
the agenda. 
3. 03/0920/Dec07: Documentation Issue: The BOI members were issued with the complete 
set of documents relating to the BOI. Most significantly this included References B and C. A 
list of other pertinent documents that were available can be seen at paragraph 3.2. 
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4. 03/0920/Dec07 — 03/1100/Dec07: Document Review: The BOI Members read through the 
provided documentation in their own time appraising themselves of all information and detail 
recorded to date. 
5. 03/1100/Dec07 — 03/1250/Dec07: Document Review Discussion: The BOI members were 
individually invited to air any points resulting from the document review that required 
clarification and/or confirmation. 
6. 03/1250/Dec07 — 03/1320/Dec07: Break. 
7. 03/1320/Dec07 — 03/1500/Dec07: Site visit: The BOI departed the [Demining group] Camp 
for the minefield in order to view the scene of the accident and confirm/clarify the details of 
the document review and raise any other issues. 
8. 03/1500/Dec07 — 03/1600/Dec07: Confirmation of site visit: Confirmatory discussions 
confirming findings/conclusions arrived at on-site. 
9. 03/1600/Dec07 — 03/1725/Dec07: Conclusions discussion: Discussions aimed at 
confirming evidence/facts and at arriving at conclusions. 
10. 03/1725/Dec07 — 03/1810/Dec07: [Name removed] (QA Officer) witness called: Interview 
of UNMAO QA to confirm statement and to question specifics. 
11. 03/1810/Dec07 — 03/1840/Dec07: Conclusions & Recommendations discussions 
continue: Conclusions and recommendations drafted, agreed upon and finalised by the BOI 
members. 
12. 03/1850/Dec07: BOI proceedings closed: BOI proceeding closed with the agreement of 
the Conclusions & Recommendations and with the understanding that the BOI members will 
meet the morning of the 04 Dec to sign the draft of the agreed Conclusions & 
Recommendations. 
13. 04/0915/Dec07: Signing of drafted Conclusions and Recommendations: BOI met to sign 
agreed Conclusions and Recommendations (see Inclusion 4). Discussion ensued regarding 
additional requests from 2 members of the Board (see paragraph 4.3 for detail). 
14. 04/1130/Dec07: BOI dispersed. 
3.2 The following provides a list of significant documentation other than References B and C 
that was made available to the BOI and that was utilised to varying degrees during its 
deliberations: 
3.2.1 Sudan Mine Action Programme (SudanMAP) National Technical Standards and 
Guidelines (NTSG), Part 1, Edition 8. 
3.2.2 [Demining group] United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP) — September 2007 
3.2.3 Task Dossier NR 206 
3.2.4 [Demining group] On-Site Documentation including: 
3.2.4.1 Communication Log: Dating back to 24 October 2006 this documentation, whilst 
lacking in detail, is consistent throughout and provides the basic detail of daily work 
commencement, completion and significant events i e mine finds throughout the time of the 
task. The final log provided provides the detail of the mine accident. 
3.2.4.2 External QA Log: This dates back to 24 June 2006 and provides the IMSMA QA 
reports for all External QA inspections and/or monitoring conducted by the QAO since this 
time. The final report is dated 15 November 2007. 
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3.2.4.3 [Demining group] QC Log: This dates back to 24 October 2006. Whilst it is considered 
to lack critical detail, it was found to be consistent throughout and provide the basic detail and 
results of internal QC conducted by the [Demining group] throughout the time of the task. The 
final log is dated 20 November 2007. 
NOTE: Henceforth, the term [Demining group] when used refers to both [Demining group] I 
and II.  
3.2.4.4 Visitors Log: This was found to be concise and in order. 
3.2.4.5 Casevac Log: This was found to have 5 entries commencing 13 August 2007 and 
detailing `casevac exercises' conducted that day and monthly through until 05 November 
2007. The final entry in this log is the casevac of the casualty as a result of the subject matter 
mine accident. 
3.2.2.6 Site Map/Sketch: Providing details of the site layout, clearance to date, mines 
found/destroyed etc 
3.2.2.7 Accident Site Sketch: This provided detail of the immediate and local vicinity of the 
mine accident. It can be found at Exhibit 0 of Reference C and has also been incorporated at 
Appendix 12 of Reference B. [Not reproduced.] 
3.2.5 The following Witness Statements were presented to the BOI: 
3.2.5.1 Sergeant [Name removed] — Usual role Section Commander of Section-1, MCT-1 of 
[Demining group]-II but was in the role of Acting Platoon Commander of MCT-1 on the day of 
the accident. This witness provided 2 statements which can be seen in References B and C 
and Inclusions 2 & 3 respectively. 
3.2.5.2 Private [Name removed] — Deminer in Section-1, MCT-1 of [Demining group]-II. This 
witness provided 2 statements which can be seen at References B and C respectively and 
Inclusions 2 & 3 respectively. 
3.2.5.3 [The Victim] — Usual role Deminer in Section-1, MCT-1 of [Demining group]-II but was 
in the role of Acting Section Commander, Section-1 of MCT-1 on the day of the accident. This 
witness is the casualty and his statement can be found in Reference C/Inclusion 3. 
3.2.5.4 Private [Name removed] — Usual role of Deminer in Section-2, MCT-1 of [Demining 
group]-II but was in the role of Acting Section Commander, Section-2 of MCT-1 on the day of 
the accident. This witness statement can be found in Reference C/Inclusion 3. 
3.2.5.5 Sergeant [Name removed] — Usual role Section Commander in Section-1, MCT-1 of 
[Demining group]-II but was in role of Acting Deputy Platoon Commander of MCT-1 on the 
day of the accident. This witness statement can be found in Reference C/Inclusion 3. 
3.2.5.6 Captain [Name removed] — Platoon Commander, MCT-1 of [Demining group]-II. This 
witness statement can be found in Reference C/Inclusion 3. 
3.2.5.7 AWO [Name removed] — Deputy Platoon Commander, MCT-1 of [Demining group]-II. 
This witness statement in the form of questions/answers can be found in Reference 
C/Inclusion 3. 
3.2.5.8 [Name removed] — UNMAO QAO Damazin sub-office. The normal and routine duties 
of this witness include those QA duties stipulated by UNMAO and covers the mine action 
activities of [Demining group]-II/ This witness statement can be found at `Inclusion 5' of this 
report. 
3.2.6 Other documentation as per the following list and included as 'Inclusion 6' of this report 
were also presented to the BOI: 
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3.2.6.1 Initial Contact Report of Mine Accident  
3.2.6.2 Initial Detailed Report 
3.2.6.3 Detailed Written Report of Mine Accident 
3.2.6.4 BOI Mine Accident — Letter from [Demining group] CO to UNMAO Sudan MAP 
Director of Mine action. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Based on the events summarised in the Table at paragraph 3.1, the BOI arrived at the 
following conclusions: 
4.1.1 Conclusions Directly Impacting On The Accident: Based on the BOI findings it is 
concluded that the following had a direct impact on the accident occurring and its subsequent 
results: 
4.1.1.1 That the accident is considered to have been caused by the detonation of an 
explosive device most likely to have been an anti-personnel mine of unknown designation. 
4.1.1.2 That, from the investigation of the seat of the explosion, the floor of the crater caused 
by the explosion was at 18 cm below the surrounding ground level. 
4.1.1.3 That, from the investigation of the seat of the explosion, excavation during clearance 
operations in the specific location of the explosion was at a depth of 11cm. 
4.1.1.4 That, from an investigation of areas randomly chosen and within the immediate vicinity 
of the accident spot, required clearance depths were found to have been achieved i.e. 15cm. 
4.1.1.5 That there was absolutely no evidence of any kind to suggest that re-mining had taken 
place. 
4.1.1.6 That the accident was the result of a missed mine during clearance operations. 
4.1.1.7 That clearance of the specific area of the accident had not achieved the standards 
required for the task i.e. that the 15cm depth had not been achieved. 
4.1.2 Conclusions That May Have Directly Or Indirectly Impacted On The Event: Based on 
the findings of the BOI the following may have had a direct or indirect impact on the accident 
occurring and its subsequent results: 
4.1.2.1 The continual rotation of appointments and of individuals conducting roles that they 
were not accredited to do so and/or had not received training for. 
NOTE: This practice had been observed previously (15/09/07) by the QAO and should have 
been appropriately actioned and recorded at that time thus possibly ensuring that it was not 
repeated. 
4.1.2.2 The QC methodology and process is not sufficiently effective to ensure that an 
incident of a missed mine will not occur i.e. is there a requirement for additional QC in the 
proximity where there have been mines found? 
4.1.2.3 The lack of evidence that Internal QA as per accredited SOPs had been conducted. 
4.1.3 Other Conclusions: Based on the findings of the BOI the following additional 
conclusions that had no direct or indirect impact on the accident or the subsequent results 
have been arrived at: 
4.1.3.1 That the casualty evacuation from minefield, the immediate medical care and the 
subsequent care at the Level 1 facility was of an exemplary standard. This is to be 
commended. 
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4.1.3.2 That documented procedures i.e. those in accredited SOPs, NTSG and other 
applicable documentation, had not been applied as is the requirement. This particularly 
applies to the manning and organisational structure of the MCTs and of CASEVAC request 
procedures. 
4.1.3.3 That on-site record keeping and details by the [Demining group]-II MCTs is not 
sufficiently accurate and detailed to provide the necessary auditable trail of information 
required in the event of an incident such as this occurring or indeed for general everyday 
checks. This is particularly applicable with regards to details of: 
4.1.3.3.1 The details of the deminer and the area/lane he has cleared, when he cleared it and 
the method used. 
4.1.3.3.2 The details of any QC conducted, who conducted it, the specific area that was QC'd, 
when it was QC'd, the methodology used to and the results/actions. 
4.1.3.4 It is concluded that the UNMAO QA records are not sufficiently accurate enough to 
provide an auditable trail of the exact nature of the visit but more specifically which area was 
visited, any actions carried out and findings/comment relevant to that specific area. 
4.1.3.5 Whilst it is acknowledged that the [Demining group]-II QC methodology for 'complete 
excavation' as detailed within the accredited SOPs i.e. 'In case of complete excavation 
method, the excavated lane will be checked by the section commander by making 1 x 1 sq m 
and 15 cm deep trench for correct width (1m) and depth (15cm)' is sufficient in its intent it is 
concluded that the detail needs expanding on by quite some margin as it does not provide a 
significant amount of information that is required i.e. 
4.1.3.5.1 Where is the QC to be conducted i.e. what part of the lane/area and who decides? 
4.1.3.5.2 Under what circumstances will the QC area i.e. 1m2 be increased and who decides? 
4.1.3.5.3 What are the failure criteria?  
4.1.3.5.4 What is the exact methodology? 
4.1.3.6 That there is a requirement for UNMIS/UNMAO to clearly define the reporting chain 
and chain of command with regards to actions, events, occurrences and incidents in the 
minefield. This will avoid confrontations such as that that ensued with regards to the on-site 
documentation. 
4.1.3.7 [Demining group]-II on-site documentation and documentation from other agencies 
often did not contain/provide sufficient detail and was sometimes poorly kept. 
4.2 As detailed in the 'Comments/Remarks' column of Ser 13 of the table at paragraph 3.1 an 
authenticated copy of the agreed 'Conclusions' can be found at Inclusion 4. 
4.3 As detailed in the Comments/Remarks' column of Ser 13 of the table at paragraph 3.1, a 
discussion surrounding the exclusion of a specific paragraph from Reference B and the 
inclusion of an additional conclusion ensued at the meeting arraigned for the BOI members to 
sign-off on the agreed 'Conclusions & Recommendations'. The Chairman and BOI Member 1, 
[Name removed], disagreed that either of these issues should be should be addressed as 
requested. The Chairman made the final decision that the 2 Members requesting the changes 
should provide relevant statements detailing this matter but that no additions would be made 
to the previously agreed `Conclusions' and that the paragraph from Reference B would not be 
removed. The orilinals of the aforementioned statements can be found at 'Inclusion 7' with a 
typed version at AppeWx 1 to this report. 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
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5.1 The following recommendations are put forward based on the findings of the BOI and it is 
further recommended that they are to be adopted and/or complied with by the [Demining 
group]-II and where applicable by the wider SudanMAP community. 
5.1.1 That the [Demining group]-II undergoes a refresher training programme at the earliest 
possible opportunity and prior to recommencing operational mine clearance activities. This 
programme is to be submitted to UNMAO for approval and is to consist of all applicable 
activities. 
5.1.2 That 'special monitoring' of the refresher training is conducted by UNMAO on a regular 
basis the results of which are documented and recorded as appropriate. Furthermore, the 
[Demining group]-II will not be allowed to recommence operational mine clearance activities 
until approved to do so by UNMAO. 
5.1.3 That those areas already `cleared' within M/F 91 are subjected to further QC processes 
in the form of MDD and/or mech to ensure no further incidences of missed mines have 
occurred. 
5.1.4 That the on-site documentation is amended to reflect sufficient detail to provide an 
effective and efficient auditable trail of all clearance and QC activities. This should be 
regularly audited as part of internal/external QA/QC procedures to ensure legibility, detail and 
clarity. 
5.1.5 That SOPs and other applicable documentation are reviewed and amended to provide 
clearer and more concise details of QC procedures that cover in an effective manner 
foreseeable eventualities. 
5.1.6 That documented procedures as required by accredited SOPs, NTSG and/or other 
applicable documentation are to be complied with and adhered to. They are not to be 
circumvented in any manner unless appropriate processes relating to gaining appropriate 
authorisation are complied with. Most significantly this applies to the [Demining group]-II leave 
rotation plan and the requirement to ensure that appropriate, sufficient and effective 
Command & Control elements are in place at all times as per accreditation. 
5.1.7 External/Internal QA procedures must adhere to documented processes and 
responsible appointments must ensure that all non-conformities are recorded and acted upon 
in the appropriate manner and as per documented procedures. 
5.1.8 The BOI agrees with and endorses the recommendation made at paragraph a, page 21 
under the title 'Recommendations of the Court' of Reference C/Inclusion 3 to this report. 
6. SUMMARY 
6.1 At approximately 07:55hrs on 21 November 2007 a mine accident occurred within the 
hazardous area of Minefield NR 91 during operations being conducted as part of Task NR 
206. The accident resulted in injuries being sustained by a member of the MCT 1 of the 
[Demining group]-II. 
6.2 As a result of the injuries sustained by the casualty, casevac from the hazardous area to 
the Level 1 facility at Kurmuk was required and subsequently from there to the Level 2 facility 
at Damazin and onward to further medical care facilities. 
6.3 A BOI was convened in order to document the findings resulting from the investigation 
into the accident, relevant events pre and post accident, to provide conclusions as to the 
probable and most likely causes and to provide pertinent recommendations aimed at reducing 
the possibility of such an occurrence happening again and at improving and/or correcting 
procedures pre and/or post accident. 
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6.4 Whilst this is a serious and possibly avoidable incident, it should not detract from the 
excellent and admirable achievements of the [Demining group]-II to date. However, to ensure 
that the likelihood of incidences of this nature being repeated by the [Demining group]-II 
and/or by the wider mine action community are reduced to acceptable levels, it is 
recommended that the recommendations within this report are complied with and 
implemented as detailed. 
7. RECOGNITION 
7.1 The Chairman of the BOI thanks the CO of the [Demining group]-II for hosting the BOI 
and for providing all assistance and support as requested. 
7.2 Further thanks are extended to the members of the BOI for their participation and 
assistance in concluding their assigned duties in this matter. 
8. BOI MEMBERS SIGNATURES 
8.1 The BOI Members have endorsed this report in the draft as presented here by providing a 
signed declaration as found at 'Inclusion 8'. If thought pertinent additional comments by 
individual members are also recorded. 
Signed: Date:  05/12/07 
Rank/Position: Sudan MAP National QA Coordinator BOI Chairman 
 
Annex A to Convening Order UNMAO/[Demining group]/Kurmuk/A/01 (as amended) 
Date — 05 December 2007 
Member 2 Maj [Name removed], ATO [Demining group] -II Disagrees following: 
a. Not inclusion of one of the conclusion that "on the day area, in which the accident took 
place was cleared, the organisation/task structure working in the minefield and the place of 
the accidented site was in order". 
b. Exclusion of para 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of this BOI being shown reservation of the Chairman 
nullifying fact/evidence of remining shown in internal investigation report of the [Demining 
group]-II whereas the fact/evidence has already been established at conclusions and 
recommendations of this BOI. And reservation of the find's have nothing to play any part 
during/outcome of the investigations of this BOI. 
Member 3 [Name removed] (Reservation) 
I [Name removed] of [Demining group]-II being member of the BOI disagree with para 3.3.1 of 
the Preliminary Investigations 'PI' particularly and generally as a whole except all those 
references relevant to the incident. This PI is suppose to be nullified as we are finding the 
facts. I think this has no relation with the BOI findings and recommendations. On the other 
hand copy of Internal Investigations is with BOI. This is opinion of the organisation and legal 
document. It also reflects opinion of organisation in finding/conclusion of BOI. Para 3.3.1 of PI 
does not reflects the fact, if it same then it is personal opinion. BOI is here to find facts. This is 
irrelevant to BOI. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 757 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 36 Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
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Compensation: UN compensation Time to hospital: 25 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Worn but not recorded 
in detail 
 
Summary of injuries: 
severe Foot 
COMMENT: See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
IMSMA report: DoB: 2-3-1971: 
Injury to: Lower limbs 
Time to first hospital: 25 minutes 
The person wore PPE. 
Device: M14 AP mine 
History of Present Illness 
Patient was injured on the date, time and location as mentioned above. 
Onsite he had severe injury at his Left Foot – posterior part of the ankle with severe bleeding 
from his wound. 
Basic life support was provided onsite by medic within 10min of the incident. 
The patient was moved to level I clinic and received by the attending doctor. 
The wound was opened and wound was inspected by the Medical Officer at Level I clinic. 
On Examination 
The patient looked ill, not in pain. Vital signs were normal. 
Wound was dressed and the whole limb was raised. 
No fragmentation was found on inspection. 
No Metal Fragmentation was found on x-ray 
Management: 
Bleeding was stopped with proper dressing on site. 
Wound debridement was done at level I and under general anaesthesia at level II. 
IV fluids were given with broad spectrum antibiotics. 
The left lower limb was put on a splint. 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
This kind of injury was due to explosion. 
The patient received proper management at all levels. 
Patient needs to be transferred to hospital with orthopaedic and plastic surgery facilities. 
14 
Further information could be obtained from the treating surgeon at Level II Hospital. 
Signed: National Medical Advisor, UNMAO 
 
Statements 
Statement by UN QA Officer 
STATEMENT BY [Name removed] (UNMAO QA OFFICER DAMAZIN SUB-OFFICE) IN 
RESPECT TO … ACCIDENT THAT ACCURED IN KURMUK ON 21 NOV 07  
I the above mentioned hereby state the following concerning the above mentioned accident: 
My primary delegated responsibility is to conduct external monitoring of organization in AOR 
(Area of responsibility) by visiting all task sites as often as practicably possible. Visits are 
coordinated to occur at the beginning of organization arrival in AOR, during training, during 
commencement of the task, when task is in progress and on completion of the same. 
[Demining group] 2 is one of the organizations in AOR hence I have a working relationship 
with them. 
Brief background of [Demining group]: 
Advance party arrival of the company: 22nd May 2007 
Main party arrival of the company: 15th June 2007 
Refresher training of advanced party: 30th May 2007 -16th June 2007 
Refresher training of complete de-mining company: 17th June 2007- 5th July 2007 
QA training that I conducted: 26th June 2007 and 28th June 2007. 
The result of this training (QA) was FAIL. 
My comments on the QA were as follows: 
• Failure to observe basic de-mining drills. 
• Procedures not being taught inline to the organization SOP. 
• Instructors not giving correct answers to all questions. 
• Instructors not correcting faults during practical training. 
• Need for improvement of QA/QC process during the training. 
External Monitoring Visits: 
During my visits to this particular team on various dates, twelve (12) IMSMA QA were 
completed and concerns/ suggestions reflected accordingly. The same results/concerns were 
on all occasions discussed with team leaders and the OC who oftenly availed himself onsite 
during my said visits. 
Monitored Activities: 
1. Command and Control General comments:- 
• QA checks not correctly logged. 
• Team leader needs to improve on documentation. 
• Some areas not clearly marked. 
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2. Manual clearance:- General comments:- 
• Minor non-conformities of entries in the task map. 
• Good progress of task execution. 
• Good drills and procedures. 
• Good command and control. 
• Minor non-conformities with regard to item found and recorded. 
• Minor non-conformity of QA logging. 
3. General team leader 
Minefield marking - Comments noted for future compliance:- 
• Non-conformity of progressive QC inspection marking, not adhering to standards and 
bench marking. 
• Discipline in the minefield. 
• Good command and control. 
• Despite the marking conforming to organization SOP and NTSG, there was minor 
non - conformity of reference point on the ground. 
• The marking does not meet the onsite requirement. 
4. Team leader comments - Points noted for future compliance:- Commanding Officer's 
concern regarding QA/QC after the accident: 
Q - Did the QA officer ever dig a pit to see the depth of the excavation?  
A - NO. 
My Answer - I absolutely agree with the officer commanding that I never dug a pit because it 
is not the right procedure according to guidelines in place and organization SOP. I have 
always had an excavation operator on site for depth checks. This was done during my only 
confirmation of QC checks and the operator by then was [Name removed] as reflected during 
the sampling QA on that day. The normal procedure has been to stop the de-miner, move him 
backwards and then with a 15 cm stick check if the already excavated area is up to the 
required depth of 15cm. Regarding the sampling process I always go through the area that 
has been QC by the team leader and section commander and would move my QC stick to 
theirs to confirm what is documented in their QC log. It is well pointed out in their SOP that 
checks will be conducted by the platoon commander, section commander and de-miner and 
would be carried out in the same manner as detector method. 
The right procedure that I pointed out to them and brought to the attention of the OC and all 
the team leaders in the presence of the regional QA officer and Damazin OPS officer was 
excavation of 1x1M trench of a 15cm depth during the team on-site assessment. They 
reluctantly did not adopt giving reasons that it was not in their NTSG and their organization 
SOP. This was verbal guidance to OC and his team leaders regarding excavation during on-
site assessments of their teams. I had insisted on ensuring that the QC process does not 
override missed action/safety during excavation. The issue was later further sought for 
clarification via emails. 
My advice to them was that during excavation clearance, deminers work in lanes of the same 
configuration to those used during detector work. Excavation techniques can often seem 
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slower than detector work, but are useful under difficult circumstances. I reminded them that it 
should always be remembered that the excavation method provides the highest level of 
clearance confidence of any technique, therefore there was need for strict supervision during 
the actual clearance to avoid missed action due to difficulties in checking key elements in the 
whole excavated area. 
The guidance/advice given was that before starting the excavation the depth to which the 
search should take place must be carefully considered. Anti-personnel mines are usually laid 
at a depth of less than 10cm, but local topography can result in soil shifting that may have 
buried the mines to a greater depth. 
The starting point should be selected inside the known safe area. A trench 1,2m wide and to 
the required depth, usually 15cm, and as indicated in figure 1 [Diagram omitted] below that is 
dug alongside the line marking the boundary of safe and dangerous ground. The trench 
should be at least 1 metre from front to rear, to ensure that the de-miner can squat on the 
trench floor. 
Digging of the initial trench which falls within safe ground may be carried out using spades or 
hoes which are faster. To advance the excavation into the dangerous area, the de-miner uses 
a trowel to scrape the front face of the trench to the rear. 
This was demonstrated to them and they were reminded that safety was a priority in all 
procedures. This was neither adopted nor amended in their SOP as per my advice/guidance 
and could not reflect in QA reports because it was not non-conformity to their SOP. Procedure 
during QC of digging holes as was seen after accident was incorrect according to their SOP 
and NTSG. 
My role for confirmation concerning excavation is during the post clearance phase which is 
clearly mentioned in the NTSG. 
The OC's concern that Sgt [Name removed] gave briefing to QA Officer which was never 
objected by QA Officer —is incorrect because I declined in a polite (different) way as 
explained below: 
• On my arrival at the work site the platoon commander was not on site and I was 
informed he would come in 5 minutes. 
• I accepted to be briefed by the Sgt on the ongoing activities as we waited for the 
platoon commander. Sgt briefed me commendably but I did not ask him questions/ 
clarification in anticipation of doing that with the platoon commander who was in-
charge of the site on that particular day despite having excused himself for whatever 
reasons he had. 
• When the platoon commander arrived I informed him that Sgt had briefed me in 
general and that I was waiting for him to clarify specific issues of concern on what 
had been pointed out. The bone of contention was the task map which was not in 
accordance to NTSG. After questions/ clarifications and after he told me that he 
would take corrective actions, he gave me his safety brief after which I signed a 
demnity form and we proceeded with him to the minefield. All this is documented on 
the QA form for that day and signed by Captain [Name removed] and not Sgt [Name 
removed]. lt is well understood that whoever signs of the QA form is in charge of that 
minefield. 
• I normally cultivate confidence in all personnel, right from the deminers and team 
leaders by listening to issues that are their direct responsibility and one (1) step 
higher than their responsibility. According to the organization responsibilities structure 
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(SOP) one (1) up is acceptable and not two (2) up, which has never happened with 
my knowledge. With all due respect to military ethics, I strongly feel that issues 
regarding ranks and appointment in the minefield, military appointments at the 
worksite should supersede military ranking especially during operation to ensure that 
experienced people make decisions on technical details. Command elements of the 
company have been a key problem issue for sometime but after lengthy deliberations, 
it was agreed that supervision would always be as in SOP. Deliberations/request for 
supervisory role of the subject matter is via emails by the OC to the Sub-Office which 
can be availed if requested by the board. 
My opinion of issues that need to be addressed to avoid similar occurrences in future: 
• Adhering to the command structure as reflected in the organization structure as per 
their SOP and not what has been currently happening with constant change of key 
persons in both teams. It is agreed that management of personnel is the company's 
responsibility but should be with consultation with UNMAO Sub-Office. 
• Improvement of supervision level can be realized if team leaders and section 
commanders perform their duties and independently carry out their tasks irrespective 
of the system ranking structure, the most important aspect is that they are appointed 
and trained in those duties. 
• Ensure that administrative problems do not impact on personnel working in the 
minefield. as documented in my QA report. 
• Key team personnel (especially those in supervisory role) should be onsite when 
work is ongoing as clearly pointed out in my QA report dated 23/08/07, whereby I 
pointed out to the team leader to strive towards ensuring that all operational 
equipment, stores and personnel are in place during operations. 
• Headquarters should improve coordination of the two teams and leave planning, 
general administration of the company and other duties to company support 
personnel as opposed to engaging operation personnel to the extent of adversely 
affecting supervision of the teams. 
Finally, from my two years experience in the AOR, cases of re-mining or any indication that it 
could occur have never emerged. [Demining group] 1 worked in the same general area and 
interference/intrusion by the locals was more but such an incident never occurred. Similarly 
[International NGO 1] worked in the same general area with [International NGO 2] clearance 
teams in vicinity. The efforts displayed by the [Demining group] 2 deminers has been 
commendable taking into account the challenges faced due to terrain, vegetation and weather 
conditions. [Demining group] 2 requires constant support from the presently appointed 
command on safety, effectiveness and efficiency when carrying out their duties. 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the 
investigation determined that the accident occurred on “cleared” land that had not been 
processed to the required depth. The demining group left inexperienced personnel in charge 
in the field and one of them was the Victim in the accident. 
18 
The site was severely disrupted after the accident, presumably in the attempt to avoid 
censure. The disruption included moving the marking and the apparent levelling of the crater. 
AP mine blasts do not leave level loose ground that must be dug out to determine the depth 
of ground disturbance. Digging did not confirm the depth at which the mine had detonated. It 
did confirm that the undisturbed ground marked the depth of the original excavation, proving 
that the ground was not processed to the required depth during clearance. Because disturbed 
ground has more bulk than compacted ground, the actual depth of clearance was probably 
less than that measured. 
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the demining 
group’s managers placed staff in positions of field responsibility for which they were not 
prepared, and because the UN QA system recognised but did not correct this error. The UN 
QA officer’s statement shows an intelligent approach promoting teamwork, but it may be that, 
when dealing with a military hierarchy, a more dogmatic approach to QA would be 
appropriate.   
The mine type was not positively determined but was [by inference] either the PRB M35 or 
the M14. Because far more PRB M35s have been found than M14s, a PRB M35 is presumed. 
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